Quote of the Day: Realism vs Liberalism

I think this is where the prospects for liberal/realist synthesis really come into view. At its best, realism isn’t just cynicism, it’s a recognition of the important reality that other countries have their own real and perceived interests and that effective US foreign policy needs to take that into account. And at its worst, the liberal humanitarian impulse becomes less about actually helping other than about appropriating vaguely high-minded rhetoric to mass an agenda of arrogance (see e.g., Max Boot’s paen to the virtues of imperialism). Productive synthesis between this impulses can be a guide to good policy, and the useful corrective in both cases is empathy — the idea that others’ point of view should be taken seriously. -Mathew Yglesias

Quotes of the Day: Foreign policy

The drive for radical change everywhere else–this is a broader, but more accurate, description of what I was trying to say when I referred to pro-invasion arguments that took for granted that “our government essentially has the right to shape and dominate the politics of other parts of the world and to use force to quash resistance to its efforts.” We seek this radical change partly because we do not really understand the world and want to make it more like ourselves, and partly because it gives us an occasion to celebrate ourselves. Both are ultimately a function of pride, but this is then formalized into an entire mythology, capped off by tales of the importance of Pax Americana. The war in Iraq has been a particularly blunt, cruel application of this pursuit of radical change, but it is the pursuit of such change that led Wilson to send our men into the slaughterhouse of WWI, inspired the creation of the Great Society on the Mekong and which has propelled the Second Inaugural’s ideas of American-led global democratic revolution. Obama referred to the “mindset that led to war” in his early primary speeches on Iraq. That mindset is that the world is ours to do with as we please, and anyone who says differently is aligned with malign forces that wish us ill. This radical change is necessarily violent and aimed at the destruction or dramatic reorganization of other polities. Boundaries will be redrawn as we wish (e.g., Kosovo), regimes will be overthrown, and foreign populations will be thrown into upheaval, and it will be an article of faith that everyone affected (except perhaps the dead) are better off. The striking thing is that this is considered to be well within the bounds of normal, respectable, sane discourse, and critiques of these views are considered to be ramblings of a wild and woolly-minded fringe. -Daniel Larison

And:

This is going to necessarily depend a lot on perspective, of course, but I think a huge amount of our foreign policy vision is predicated on assumptions that are radical; our people, meanwhile, don't understand their radicalism. Anyone who has considered our foreign policy aloud in various online fora will be aware that the idea that the United States can act with impunity in any country, at any time, for any reason, ever, is one that is held by many people. And it's not even as if this is some dearly-held belief that people defend rabidly; no, it slides by as though it needs no defense. It's just the baseline assumption for many Americans who don't traffic in foreign policy debate. -Freddie

Good news of the day: Georgia and Ukraine

Nato has reaffirmed that Ukraine and Georgia will eventually join the alliance, without offering them formal roadmaps towards membership.

Instead, Nato foreign ministers meeting in Brussels said the two nations should pursue reforms needed to join the bloc, without giving any timetable for entry. -BBC

Last week, Rice attempted to make a final push to force NATO to accept Georgia and Ukraine before Bush steps down. I did not think she would succeed and thankfully, she did not. It seems European countries have a better understanding of the danger of accepting nations lead by unstable and unpredictable leaders bent on confronting Russia.

Obama also claims to back Georgia and Ukraine entry in the alliance, but at least we know that Bush did not manage to make it happen in his last months. We will have to wait and see what Obama does once in power, but we can sleep safe for a few months.

How to deal with Pakistan following Mumbai

It is slightly depressing, yet totally foreseeable, to see the reactions following the terrorist attacks on Mumbai. It seems that everyone follow the script: the BJP talks tough, the Congress tries to look tough with Pakistan, Pakistan tries to appease India while Indians put all the blame on Pakistan. Those reactions are normal given the history of the region, it seems things have not changed much since the debate between Jinnah and Gandhi.

But an interesting aspect is that the reactions have been fairly muted until now; there is no trouble in Kashmir, there have been no violent riots in India and Pakistan is trying to be helpful. While nationalist tendencies push both countries to follow the usual route, it seems both governments try to keep the lid on the boiling cauldron. I find this an encouraging sign. This event could end up being important for the region because it might make the civilian government and the army in Islamabad realize that they are once again losing control of their country and their foreign policy.

When I heard that Obama was planning to spend energy trying to solve the Kashmir crisis, I said it was a dangerous waste of time. It was not because I did not believe that settling the Kashmir issue was worthwhile, it was because I did not believe it was possible under the current circumstance; largely because there is no consensus that could be achieved which would have widespread support in both nations and that the governments (especially Pakistan) have no control over actors that could easily spoil negotiations. This is exactly what happened in Mumbai. While the specific of the attacks could not be predicted, anyone could have predicted that third parties would try something similar and what would be the reactions.

So what is the solution? Like I said before the attacks, Obama should drop his Kashmir plans. They were unrealistic before the attacks and they look like daydreaming now. But I think he should attempt to spin recent events in Islamabad in a way that could benefit the region and the US. The argument would be that those attacks, as well as the recent Islamabad Marriot bombing show that the strategy of using armed groups to achieve political objectives might be good in the short term but ultimately lead to a loss of control over the country. I agree with Juan Cole that the attacks are more than likely a splinter group of a Kashmiri mujaheddin organization. To the government this means that they have their hands tied, they can not move the country in a direction if the third party groups they funded in the past disagree.

Zardari would be obviously in agreement with this, but the goal would be to bring the army to agree. Zardari is took weak to take on the ISI and the now largely independent Islamists, but with the army on board he might be able to turn things around. The problem is that since General Zia's coup in 1977, the army has been packed with fundamentalists; but even if they might be sympathetic to the aims of Islamists, their interests lie with the state (they are the state's strongest institution after all).

So what is my solution? Drop the ridiculous attempts at peace with Kashmir and attempt to convince state actors that clamping down on non-state organizations is in their interests. No durable peace will be achieved unless the Pakistani state can regain the control it once had, and the attacks of the last years (Bhutto, Marriot, Mumbai) might begin to make people in power realize that they need to take action for their own good (and not to please some hated distant US).

Quote of the Day: Lessons of Iraq

My own (provisional) view is that the Iraq War tells us a great deal about the limits/costs of using large-scale military force in situations where the stakes are vastly higher for our opponents than for ourselves, a great deal about America's ability, or lack thereof, to transform dysfunctional societies through occupation, a fair amount about the limits of pro-democracy sentiment as a north star for policymaking, and a fair amount about the limits of American power, period. I think it tells us less than many liberals and conservatives think about the particular incompetence of Bush's war cabinet (though clearly it tells us something on that score!), less than many liberals (and some realists) think about the importance of international organizations and their utility for crisis management in high-stakes situations, and less than many progressives and paleoconservatives think about whether the U.S. should radically scale down its involvement in Middle Eastern politics, and more broadly abandon its informal-empire commitments around the world. -Ross Douthat

Iraq post American occupation

From Michael Totten in Commentary:

Many American soldiers agree. “Everyone says things will implode after we leave,” Lieutenant Eric Kuylman told me. “They’ll blame it on politics and religion, but it’s not going to be any of that. It’s going to be about straight power. It’s going to be guys trying to one-up each other. It’s going to be key people in cities just like this who will want to seize the power gaps. It’s going to break down along tribal lines and these militias that we’ve put in place. When we pull out, there will be power vacuums. There will be pockets of people that we’ve put in power. I mean, everybody already has shaky alliances as it is. So what you’re going to see is the straight seizing of power. People are going to try to put their own tags on it, but it’s just about the seizure of power. It’s not going to be Sunni or Shia, nothing like it. It’s just going to be men who want control.”

I mostly agree with this. There will be more violence following USA withdrawal from Iraq because there will be power vacuums in a country overflowing with armed men used to settle conflicts with violence (because of their experiences of the last 5 years of course, not because they are inherently violent). But this does not mean that long term instability will follow; in my opinion, the odds that it goes the Somalia route are low, the internal stability in Vietnam after the Fall of Saigon (if you discount war against external enemies) is a more likely route. Why? Because unlike the Southern Vietnamese government, Maliki wants the US gone. It means he is fairly confident he can retain power even if they leave within a few years. It was Sadr and the Sunnis who were more uneasy about withdrawal; they are probably less confident in their abilities. As Totten writes at the end of the article:

He thinks Iraq will be okay, even so. The Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police are still shaky institutions at best, but they are much more competent than they were a few years ago. The Iraqi Army proved itself earlier this year, against nearly all expectations, when it took back areas under the control of Moqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia in Basra and Sadr City with only a limited amount of help from Americans.

Things might go as planned, but if Maliki plays his cards right he will probably be able to fill the power vacuum.

Via Andrew Sullivan

Syria first

Someone in the mainstream media agrees with me on the Middle East Here is Aaron David Miller in the Washington Post arguing for a Syria first approach to the Middle East:

The more compelling argument is for a major push on another negotiation: between Israel and Syria. Here, there are two states at the table, rather than one state and a dysfunctional national movement. A quiet border, courtesy of Henry Kissinger's 1974 disengagement diplomacy, prevails. And there are fewer settlers on the Golan Heights and no megaton issues such as the status of Jerusalem to blow up the talks. Indeed, the issues are straightforward -- withdrawal, peace, security and water -- and the gaps are clear and ready to be bridged.

For a president looking for a way to buck up America's credibility, an Israeli-Syrian agreement offers a potential bonus. Such a deal would begin to realign the region's architecture in a way that serves broader U.S. interests. The White House would have to be patient. Syria won't walk away from a 30-year relationship with Iran; weaning the Syrians from Iran would have to occur gradually, requiring a major international effort to marshal economic and political support for Damascus. Still, an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty would confront Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran with tough choices and reduced options.

I've made a similar argument before. Also here.

Via Matthew Yglesias

Update: Itamar Rabinovich over at Jerusalem Post makes essentially the same arguments (hat tip FP Passport)

The shape of things to come

Okay, the new national security team is now officially unofficially leaked. We’ll have General James Jones as National Security Adviser with Tom Donilon as his Deputy. And Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, with James Steinberg as her deputy. And Robert Gates will stay on at the Pentagon. Susan Rice will become UN Ambassador. -Matthew Yglesias

UN Ambassador is a cushy job, but it is probably not what Rice wanted. She will be stuck in New York, far away from any important policy decisions. She was one of the most "left wing" serious foreign policy advisers for Barack Obama during the campaign and she has supported him from the start. That she is being kept away from the decision making process signals that Obama will not be very "liberal" in his foreign policy. That should not come as a shock to anyone who has listened to what he said during the campaign.

If you look at all the people on the list that will actually have a say in policy, I think it becomes clear that we will have a Scowcroft/Brzezinsky realist type of foreign policy.

Smart take: Israel, Palestine and Syria

Blake Houndshell makes two good point:

Most of these ideas, regardless of whether Gates really intends to implement them, are worth exploring. I really, wonder, though, about the viability of a "big push on Israel-Palestine peace" at this point.

It hasn't gotten a lot of coverage, but the Palestinian Authority is in huge trouble right now. Hamas insists that Mahmoud Abbas's term as president expires on Jan. 9. For his part, Abbas is threatening to call presidential and parliamentary elections, the latter of which Hamas would deem illegal.

It's a huge mess, making it hard to imagine Israel engaging in serious negotiations, much less allowing a failed state to set up shop next door. As peace process veteran Aaron David Miller bluntly puts it, "The dysfunction and confusion in Palestine make a conflict-ending agreement almost impossible."

That is a huge problem right now. Whoever attempts a peace process will have to recognize that there will need to be at least 2 Palestinian representatives at the negotiating table, or that Fatah and Hamas agree to form some sort of coalition government, which is unlikely. I still think that if Kadima is reelected, there might be a way to work around it because the Arab Peace Initiative is a proposal made by Saudi Arabia and supported by the Arab League. If Hamas wants to spoil the peace process, the Arab countries are much better placed to pressure them into negotiating than any tough talking American politician. The Arab states currently believe it is in their interests to solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem because they are worried that it is fueling fundamentalism in their own country. This is an important window of opportunity for peace between Israel and Palestine, maybe in 10-15 years Arab governments will not be as worried about fundamentalism and will not actively support a peace process.

The second point:

Second, if I were Barack Obama, I'd probe the Syrians to find out what their price is for making peace with the Israelis. If it seems doable, I'd start laying the groundwork so that once the new Israeli government is in place, direct talks could quickly follow with the United States, not Turkey, as a mediator.

Claims that getting the Syrians to stop supporting Hamas will cause the Palestians to be less radical are probably overblown -- if anything, the exiled political leadership in Damascus is more pragmatic than the guys in Gaza -- but a Syria-Israel peace deal has its own logic. Syria has foolishly spurned such opportunities before, but it's worth a shot.

That is also very important. Syria has no ideological reason for not being at peace with the West and Israel. Negotiations with Syria would be one of my top priority if I was Obama (assuming Kadima is also elected in February, if Netanyahu wins, forget all hopes for peace for a while).

How to deal with Iran

Karim Sadjadpour has a 6 point plans on how to deal with Iran. Here are his 6 recommendations:

1. Build confidence on issue of common interest
2. Understand where the power lies
3. Speak softly
4. Don't let the spoilers set the tenor (ie interests groups in Iran or allied with Iran that benefit from a confrontational US-Iran relation)
5. Maintain an international approach
6. Get the timing right
   

These are all very good points. Obama should not rush to try to solve the Iran problem in a few months. He should start diplomacy slowly and build a relationship. He should recognize that doing that while acting tough might be popular domestically in the short term, his long term interest is to play nice to try to bring back Iran in the fold of the international community. Negotiating this way with Iran would make Obama susceptible to attacks by hawks and neocons who would paint him as naive, but I think it is a risk worth taking because the odds of a success are fairly high. A point not mentioned would be to also negotiate with Syria in an attempt to normalize its relation with Israel and the US; the dual goal being peace with Syria but also a weakening of Iran's position in the region, which would reflect itself at the negotiating table.

Via Matthew Yglesias

Today in the World: Georgia

According to the BBC, shots were fired near the Georgian leader today.

Georgian President Mikhail Sakaashvili was showing his Polish counterpart Lech Kaczynski the border between Georgia and the "sort of independent" republic of South Ossetia. The shot was heard when the motorcade came within 30m of the border. According to a witness, it was a South Ossetian border guard who fired warning shots.

It is likely that the shots were not aimed at the Sakaashvili, it would have been a total public relation disaster for Russia to accidentally kill Kaczynski. But it is even more likely that the shots were approved by someone high up in the Russian government. Russia might be aggressive but they are not crazy; the last thing they want is some border soldier in the Caucasus starting troubles they did not want. In all likelihood this was a message to Sakaashvili: "If you want to make trouble you better watch your back, and you better not come close to South Ossetia again."

Why Obama will not try to solve Somalia

Expending political capital on such a knotty problem--over a dozen transitional governments have tried and failed over the past 17 years--might seem imprudent at first blush. But the Somalis' very recalcitrance has yielded such low expectations that very little would actually be at risk. Moreover, an earnest attempt at conflict-resolution in Somalia would enable Mr. Obama to showcase the differences between him and his predecessor. -Jonathan Stevenson

The solution proposed by Stevenson involves talks with al-Shabaab, the strongest Islamist group in Somalia, removing them from the terrorist organization list and involving them in the peace process. That is all good advice; if a durable peace is to be established in Somalia, the USA needs to talk to all parties involved.

But where Stevenson's argument is weak is when he claims that attempting to solve the Somali puzzle would be low risk because expectations are low. This shows his total incomprehension of the domestic political environment Obama has to live in. The right wingers, the neocons and all the hawks perceive Obama as more "dovish" in foreign policy -- which is hogwash -- and they will go up in arms if Obama starts talking with "terrorists", even more if they have very low expectations of him achieving something. If he talks to al-Shabaab, it will cost him politically, because the US is still, by and large, uneasy about the necessity of talking with terrorist groups.

He could do it, but it would mean holding back on some other foreign policy problems, where there is at least a small chance of success. And it is not as if Obama was desperately trying to find things to do in January...

The reasons for Ethiopia's failure in Somalia

But the Ethiopians can't afford to stay much longer, and their repressive tactics have lost Somali hearts and minds, allowing the Islamists to regain social as well as military traction. Earlier this month, in a brutally populist application of sharia law, a 13-year old girl was stoned to death in the southern Somali city of Kismayu for alleged adultery in a stadium packed with 1,000 spectators. -Jonathan Stevenson

It seems the author is unable to see the contradiction between the two sentences. He claims that the Ethiopians are losing to the "Islamists" because of their violent and repressive ways, yet in the next sentence he gives an example of even worse brutality by the Islamists -- the stoning of a young girl because she had been raped by three men, as well as the shooting of unharmed civilians who tried to help her. But nowhere in the article does he seem to believe that this brutality might be a problem for Islamists.

In fact, Ethiopians were hated because they are widely seen as infidel foreigners. They're also seen as century long occupiers of the Ogaden, which Somalis claim as belonging to them and where 7 millions Somalis live. Somalis have fought Ethiopians in 1977-78 over this land (and lost badly). They are afraid that Ethiopia wishes to continue its eastward expansion and assimilation.

But more importantly, Ethiopia failed in Somalia because it associated itself closely with the transitional government which was almost exclusively controlled by the Darood clan who lives mainly in the northeast. They used Ethiopian support to increase their influence at the expense of the other clans, especially in and around the capital, Mogadishu. That led the clans controlling Mogadishu and southern Somalia to throw its weight in support of the Islamists, the only organized alternative to the Darood/Ethiopian alliance. They found themselves sucked in clan warfare with no end in sight; and with the political winds changing in Washington, Zenawi decided he had nothing to gain by fighting forever. That is what caused Ethiopia to fail.

Syria or Iran first?

Indeed, the Syrian elite itself may be split over Western overtures and their Iranian relationship. Whether or not it is as quixotic a dalliance as the Times suggests, it is correct that Iran is the key, and a resolution of that standoff will force Syria to move so as not to risk further isolation. -Boz

I think the logic is backward here. After eight years of a Bush administration which strengthened Iran's standing in the region through a succession of blunders, Iran's position is strong enough to be able to extract significant concessions on any sort of deal it would agree to sign with western powers. I do not think that a new President in the White House will magically shift the balance of power in the Middle East; we saw how that worked at Vienna in 1961 in regard to Russia. Iran has few incentives to give up on its nuclear program now; it knows that if it manages to build nuclear bombs, the balance of power will be further shifted toward them. I think the smart thing to do is weaken Iran's position through diplomacy and then reach a deal, rather than attempt to do so when Iran's position is strong.

Syria has shown its willingness to negotiate with Israel and to work with the west even during the Bush years. The leaders of the country are largely secular and come from a small religious minority of the population (Alawite) who have had problems of their own with fundamentalists. Therefore, they do not have any ideological objections to cooperation against terrorism. While allegedly "allied" with Iran, Syria is definitely the minor partner in the operation. The odds are that they dislike Iran's new influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah, since Syria considers Lebanon its own backyard. Again, Syria has no ideological commitment to its alliance with Iran, it is simply a marriage of convenience by two countries hated by the west. I think Syria would be much easier to bring into a peace deal with the west and Israel, by giving them back Golan Heights, normalizing relations and maybe recognizing its "special relation" with Lebanon*.

Making a deal with Syria would improve chances of reaching a satisfying peace deal with Iran, especially if other policies intended to isolate Iran diplomatically such as improved relations with Russia are pursued.

*The caveat is that this strategy depends on a Livni win in February.

Via: Arthur Goldhammer

Iran calls Iraq to resist the Security deal

The Iranian parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, has called the Iraqis to reject the US security pact.
He said Washington's goal was to "strengthening comprehensive U.S. hegemony in Iraq." and he called for continued resistance: "The Iraqi nation and parliament should realize that the time for resistance is not over yet,".

That should give pause to those who bemoan the massive influence of Iran in Iraq. But why would Iran be opposed to a deal that effectively makes Iraq a nation independent from "US meddling" in about 2-3 years if they thought they could control it? The logical conclusion is that their influence is not that deep inside Iraq despite religious similitude with the new rulers of the country; else they should welcome the withdrawal of the US.

The reality is that Arab Iraqis, even Shiites, see Iranians as Farsi foreigners. During the Iran-Iraq war, Shiites and Sunnis fought Iranians side by side and there are no history of widespread Shiites opposition to the war based on sectarian arguments. Iraqis and Persians might share a religion but there does not appear to be any sign that the former will be submissive to Iran. We saw the relevance of Iran's opposition in the cabinet vote which went 27-1. The lone dissenter was Sunni, so the odds that he voted no because of Iran pressure are, let's say, fairly low. We will see what kind of influence Iran has in the parliament vote, but I doubt it will be impressive.

Now that is not to say that Iran will not have an influence in Iraq. It is one of the major power in the region, along with Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and it will have more power than during the Ba'ath years. But those hyperventilating about how the US gave Iraq to Iran can calm down; Iraqis are proud enough not to let foreigners run the show.

There are a few caveats to my argument. Ali Larijani is not Ali Khamenei or Ahmadinejad, what he said should be taken with a grain of salt before we assume that it is the position of the Iranian government. Also, it is possible that Iran oppose the deals because they believe if Iraq waits until BO takes over, it will get a better deal and a faster withdrawal. But it is hard to see why they would get worked up on a 6-12 months earlier withdrawal; the end result would be the same.

Mark Ames on Russia

Interesting interview of Mark Ames, the author of an article on the American media framing of the Russian-Georgian conflict in The Nation, on the subject of the Russian-Georgian conflict, Russia-American relations and topics in Russia's sphere.

I talked about the conflict previously, pointing to a NY Times article which showed that the way the media framed the conflict was totally wrong. But as Ames said, the NY Times was one of the worst offender on pro Georgia bias during the conflict. There is a strong lobby in the United States that wishes to portray Russia as irrational, dangerous and a threat to world stability; they are trying, and largely succeeding, to impose their narrative on the mainstream of American politics. This is dangerous because they tell only one side of the story, they totally misunderstand Russia internal politics and they ignore or don't understand long term demographic trends which will limit Russia to being only a regional power. As Ames says in the interview, Russians are extremely sensitive to how the west see them and very angry when they think they are being treated unfairly. So the narrative could become a self-fulfilling prophecy; if the west treat Russia as if they were the "bad guys", they will start acting like it out of a lack of confidence in the west.

Here's an analogy. In psychiatry there is a defense mechanism called projective identification, which is often unconsciously used by people with borderline personality disorder and paranoid personality disorder. It is a mechanism whereas person A project an emotion on person B and will unconsciously act to make person B feel and act that way to confirm his own mistaken belief. Here is an example. If a patient is angry because his doctor is going on a vacation and he feels abandoned (that would be typical of a borderline personality disorder who are also prone to attempt suicide), he will project his anger to the doctor; he does not recognize that he is angry, he believes that it's the doctor who is angry. Then he will say, upon leaving the office, "See you after your vacations doc... if I don't kill myself". The goal is to make the doctor angry to confirm his own pathological belief. This allows the patient to avoid taking a look at himself, he can blame others instead.

This is a similar kind of behavior we are seeing in regard to USA relation with Russia. If you look at it from Russia's point of view, its relationship with the USA has been far from positive since Yelstin such as the disastrous western backed privatization, NATO expansion after promising not to do it, messing with Serbia and Kosovo without Russian support, support of Putin enemies in former Soviet Union Republics, some of whom have been in the Russian Empire for 4 centuries and Bush backing off the ABM treaty among many others humiliations. Yet the Russian point of view is never mentioned in the mainstream media, all we hear about is a totalitarian and irrational dictator bent on destroying its neighbours. Let's stop the projective identification. Go listen to Ames.

Sarko back offs on Missile Defense

Arthur Goldhammer reports that Sarkozy has backed off on his previous statement that the US should abandon its Missile Defense project in Eastern Europe. Last Friday I called Sarkozy's move shrewd. So what now? Why did he back off?

Arthur (link above) thinks that Sarkozy weaken his hands by backing off and make Russians more suspicious; and he wonders whether his new position means that he learned in Washington this weekend that Obama had no intention of removing his support for the project.

I do think it might be possible that Obama's representative to the G20 meeting, Madeleine Albright who is well known for her Russophobia, might have scared Sarkozy into believing that Obama would not back off. But after thinking about the issue, I think I stick with my original assessment. I don't think Sarkozy weakened his hand by backing off. He signaled to Russia that he was opposed to the plan and to Washington that he would support them if they decided to not go ahead with the project and his retraction shows that he would not object if they went ahead either. By retracting his previous statement, he takes a back seat and does not involve France further; he saw that loudly opposing USA foreign policy did not get Chirac very far in terms of results. The ambivalence of his position is its strength, everyone can read into it what they want but no one can be seriously angry with his position.

I still think the new US administration will eventually back off the Missile Defense plan in Obama's first term, but maybe the Russophobes will win. We'll see.

Endgame

The Iraqi Cabinet has approved the Security Pact with the US. The importance of this Pact is that it has set a timetable for withdrawal; the Coalition will have to start moving in the summer of 2009 and be out of the country by 2011. The final approval by the parliament is probably going to be a mere formality.

However this is by no mean a time for wild optimism for Iraqis. The next few years will be vital to ensure stability of the country. Now that everyone knows when Americans will be gone, the fight for power in post-USA Iraq will begin (or continue). Let's hope it will be a fight in the parliament or in debates and not fighting in the streets. I am slightly skeptical that this will happen without any violence, but we will see. Maliki appears stronger than ever, and if he continues his shrewd management, it would not be impossible for him to impose his power even without US backing.

As Kevin Drum mentions, this also has powerful implications on the domestic scene here in America. BO will not have to fight to secure American withdrawal from Iraq; he will be able to claim with a straight face that he is merely following the previous administration's policies while spending his political capital on other issues. At the same time it reminds everyone of Barack's good judgment regarding Iraq.

Quote of the day

There was a revolution; it just had little to do with the tenets of conservatism. The true nature of the revolution becomes apparent only in retrospect. Reagan unveiled it in remarks that he made on March 23, 1983. History remembers this as the occasion when the president announced his Strategic Defense Initiative. Embedded in Reagan’s remarks were two radical propositions: the minimum requirements of U.S. security required a status akin to invulnerability and modern technology was bringing this utopian goal within reach. Star Wars introduced into mainstream politics the proposition that Americans could be safe only if the United States enjoyed permanent global military supremacy. Here was Reagan’s preferred response to the crisis that Carter had identified. Here, too, can be found the strategic underpinnings of George W. Bush’s global war on terror. -Andrew J. Bachevich at TAC

One of the greatest public intellectual of the decade. Go read his book now.

Sarkozy calls Obama to back off US missile shield...

The remark is interesting because a prominent European leader said out loud what everyone believed but did not dare say: the missile shield is useless (in its current conception) and the Europeans don't really want it. The reason why he probably chose to announce this now is shrewd and shows he can see which way the wind is blowing. While it was obvious that Bush would not take the hint that the project was useless and a remark would have only highlighted the powerlessness of whoever said it; Sarkozy is betting that Obama will eventually back off on this project and he is probably right in that regard. The logic that the missile defense is not aimed at Russia but at some "rogue" state, while being deployed around Russia, did not convince anyone; it is mostly seen as a response to Russia's "aggressive" behavior. A back off on this project is probably the first thing that an Obama administration will be ready to give when they talk with Russian leaders, because it is more of a symbolic move than anything, given its overall uselessness, and Obama has stated during the campaign that he plans to cut investment for "unproven" missile defense systems so he could convincingly sell this move on the domestic front as something he had planned all along.

In the end, Russia will remember Sarkozy as the first one who spoke out against the missile defense system and domestic opinion will remember that he, contrary to Blair, could influence American Presidents. That is probably what he's banking on. Shrewd move.

Hat tip: Cernig at Newshoggers